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Solar and wind electricity generation technologies have become cost competitive and account 
for a growing share of global investment in new electricity generation capacity. Both India 
and Indonesia have ambitious targets for adoption of these technologies, and India has an 
impressive current rate of uptake. Substantial obstacles exist, however, including the 
entrenched positions of coal and other fossil fuels, regulatory barriers to market access, and 
weak abilities of electricity utilities to manage intermittent renewables. This paper reviews 
these obstacles and discusses strategies to overcome them. We focus on the use of reverse 
auction processes able to deliver low-price solar and wind contracts, as are being successfully 
employed in India, on tax and subsidy reform options, on regulatory and incentive-design 
strategies, on approaches to bolster grid management capacities, and on the importance of 
minimising protectionist barriers. Our analysis covers both small-scale and large-scale 
systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Solar and wind accounted for more than half of all net additions to global electricity 
generation capacity in 2017. In net terms, more solar capacity was installed than fossil fuel 
and nuclear power generation capacity combined (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 
2018; REN21, 2018).1 It is likely that countries will increasingly adopt solar and wind 
generation as these technologies continue to improve and their costs fall, as capacities for 
managing intermittent electricity generation are enhanced, and as a result of policy efforts to 
address the environmental consequences of fossil fuel use (International Energy Agency 
[IEA], 2017a; Bloomberg NEF, 2018). 
India and Indonesia – the second- and fourth-most populous countries in the world – provide 
contrasting case studies on early progress in the adoption of solar and wind energy. India is 
among world leaders: the 6th-largest producer of solar electricity and 4th-largest producer of 
wind electricity as of 2017 (BP, 2018). Solar and wind uptake in Indonesia has been much 
more limited. In other ways, India and Indonesia share notable similarities. Both have large 
and growing demands for electricity and have made substantial progress in broadening 
electricity access and improving the quality of electricity supply. Both remain highly reliant 
on coal for their electricity. 
India and Indonesia have ambitious targets for renewables adoption. In 2014 India set the 
target of 175 gigawatts (GW) of renewable electricity generation capacity by 2022, including 
100 GW of solar and 60 GW of wind. In 2018, a target of 275 GW of renewables by 2027 
was announced (Central Electricity Authority, 2018). India’s Nationally Determined 
Contribution to the Paris Agreement commits to 40% of its electricity capacity coming from 
non-fossil sources by 2030, “with the help of transfer of technology and low-cost 
international finance”. Indonesia has a target for renewables and “new” energy to contribute 
23% of the primary energy mix by 2025 (Government Regulation 79/2014), and its National 
Energy Plan (RUEN) has slated 8.3 GW of solar and wind to come online by 2025. Indonesia 
is not on track to meet its renewables target.2 
In years gone by, generating electricity using solar and wind typically involved higher direct 
costs than generating electricity using fossil fuels, especially coal. This is no longer the case. 
Rapid cost reductions have meant that, in many countries, solar and wind are now able to 
compete with new-build coal generators, even before considering the external costs of coal-
                                                 
1 Note, however, that solar plants typically have lower capacity factors. 
2 As of 2017, the renewables plus “new” share of Indonesia’s primary energy mix was recorded at 8% 
(Bridle et al., 2018; Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2018). This is lower than that 
reported by the IEA (2018a), whose data include use of primary biomass. Solar plus wind capacity 
was less than 0.1 GW. 
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fired generation (IRENA, 2017a). Some new solar and wind projects are now also able to 
undercut the operating costs of coal-fired power stations (Das et al., 2017; KPMG, 2017). 
Both India and Indonesia have substantial untapped solar potential. While wind endowments 
are more modest, there is nevertheless the potential to develop onshore and offshore wind 
resources (IRENA, 2017b, 2017c; Liebman and Foster, 2019). The two countries also have 
many sites that could be used for pumped hydro energy storage, which could play a key role 
in balancing renewables-dominated grids (Blakers et al., 2018). Battery costs are falling 
(Bloomberg NEF, 2018). In terms of technologies and endowments, the two countries have 
the opportunity to vastly transform their electricity systems over coming years. 
Nevertheless, uptake of solar and wind faces many challenges in India and Indonesia. These 
range from entrenched subsidies for fossil fuels and on-grid electricity, to weak electricity 
grids, regulatory barriers, and protectionist initiatives. This paper reviews these challenges 
and discusses strategies to facilitate rapid adoption of solar and wind. Some key challenges 
are currently more acute in Indonesia than in India, although the challenges faced in reaching 
high levels of intermittent renewables are large in both countries. 
A feature of India’s recent success has been its use of reverse auctions to secure low-price 
contracts for solar and wind electricity generation (Shrimali et al., 2016). One of our 
conclusions is that there is scope for Indonesia to launch a special round of large-scale 
procurement auctions of its own. An appropriate facilitating framework would be needed for 
low-range prices to be achieved. India’s solar mission-based approach, and the establishment 
of government-led solar parks, provide a potential model. 
Our paper employs an informal comparative research design (Lijphart, 1971), analysing data 
and policies from two key countries in terms of the potential for a transition from fossil fuels 
to zero-carbon energy technologies. Our choice of India and Indonesia is motivated by the 
fact that these are large and important countries, both with large endowments of coal. A 
comparative perspective is particularly useful because India has to date achieved much faster 
adoption of solar and wind than Indonesia, so there are likely to be insights from India that 
are of high relevance in the Indonesian context. The two countries are experiencing similar 
energy-sector transition challenges to those being faced in other key countries, such as 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Africa. As a result, our analysis and conclusions are of 
broad international relevance.3 
                                                 
3 We do not include China among the country case studies in order to maintain a sharp focus on the 
India/Indonesia comparison, which provides useful insights. For a recent overview of solar and wind 
policy issues in China, see Zhang (2018). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of India and Indonesia’s 
electricity sectors. Section 3 reviews the two countries’ records on uptake of solar and wind. 
Section 4 identifies key barriers to solar and wind adoption. Section 5 discusses strategies for 
overcoming these barriers. The final section concludes. 
2. The electricity sectors of India and Indonesia 
2.1 Electrification, electricity quality, and interconnectivity 
India and Indonesia – both lower-middle income economies (World Bank, 2018a) – have 
experienced impressive progress in expanding electricity access. According to IEA data, 
residential access reached 91% of Indonesia’s population and 82% of India’s by 2016, well 
up on the shares recorded at the turn of the century (Figure 1). This includes households with 
off-grid access or limited connections. 
Figure 1: Residential electrification rate, 2000–2016 
 
Source: IEA (2017b). 
 
Driven by economic growth and improved access to electricity, per capita electricity 
consumption grew at averages of more than 5% per annum in both countries over 2000–2016 
(Figure 2). The per capita electricity use trajectories of the two countries have been 
remarkably similar, with electricity use equalling around 0.9 Megawatt hours (MWh) per 
person per year in 2016. This remained well below the world average of 3.1 MWh per person 
(IEA, 2018a). Strong growth in electricity demand is expected to continue over coming years. 
Despite significant progress, electricity poverty remains a major challenge. Around 239 
million people remained without residential access to electricity in India in 2016, and 23 
million in Indonesia (IEA, 2018b). Many others have only modest access. Sustainable 
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Development Goal 7 targets universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern 
energy. It is highly desirable that uptake of solar and wind should accelerate, rather than 
compromise, progress towards this goal. 
Figure 2: Electricity consumption per capita, 1971–2016 
 
Note: Electricity consumption is across all sectors. Source: IEA (2018a). 
There have been considerable achievements in improving the quality of electricity supply in 
both countries. Transmission and distribution losses as a share of electricity output fell from 
27% and 12% in India and Indonesia in 2000 to 19% and 9% in 2014 (World Bank, 2018b). 
Electricity theft remains a particular problem in India, although it has reduced in severity 
(Gaur and Gupta, 2016). While blackouts and grid instability remain serious issues, India 
received an improving score – from 3.1 out of 7 in 2007 to 4.7 in 2017 – in the World 
Economic Forum (2018) quality of electricity supply measure, based on surveys of executive 
opinion. Indonesia’s score increased from 4.0 to 4.4. On average, electricity consumers 
experienced 19 hours of electricity outages in 2017 in Indonesia, with supply issues acute in 
outer islands (PLN, 2017). 
One notable difference between India and Indonesia is the degree of interconnectivity of their 
electricity systems. Indonesia, an archipelago of around 6,000 inhabited islands, has eight 
major networks and around 600 isolated grids (Asian Development Bank, 2016; PwC 
Indonesia, 2017a). India has greater – albeit still underdeveloped (Tongia et al., 2018) – 
national grid interconnectivity, which is being further improved under the One Nation-One 
Grid initiative (Power Grid Corporation of India, 2018) and a Green Energy Corridor 
scheme. The advantage of a more interconnected grid is that it can access solar and wind 
projects sited in high-resource locations, and enable more effective routing of supply between 
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distributed generation and demand centers. Geographical spread also helps to mitigate risks 
associated with poor solar or wind conditions in any region at any time. Relative to 
Indonesia, India is also advantaged by greater land availability in regions that are well suited 
to solar power generation (e.g. arid areas). 
2.2 Electricity mix 
Coal dominates the electricity mixes of India and Indonesia. The coal shares of their 
electricity mixes have generally been increasing, although India’s has flattened out during the 
last several years. Coal contributed 76% of India’s electricity mix in 2017 and 58% of 
Indonesia’s (Figure 3). Other fossil fuels also make important contributions, with natural gas 
contributing 20% of Indonesia’s electricity mix in 2017 (5% in India) and oil 9% (1% in 
India). Diesel generators are commonly used to generate electricity in Indonesia’s outer 
islands. In 2015, Indonesia announced a 35 GW capacity expansion program, 20 GW of 
which was to come from coal. Progress in this program has been slower than planned. 
Figure 3: Coal share of electricity generation, 2000–2017 
 
Source: BP (2018). 
 
Among non-fossil sources, hydro accounted for 9% of India’s electricity generation in 2017, 
and 7% of Indonesia’s (BP, 2018). Indonesia generates around 4% of its electricity from 
geothermal resources, with its geothermal generation ranking third in the world, behind the 
United States and the Philippines (IEA, 2018a). Solar and wind remain small contributors, 
although there is a rapid rate of increase in India (Figure 4). The solar plus wind share of 
India’s electricity mix reached 5% in 2017. More than two-thirds of this was wind. As can be 
seen in Figure 4, solar and wind electricity generation remains nascent in Indonesia. 
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Figure 4: Solar plus wind share of electricity mix, 2000–2017 
 
Source: BP (2018). Indonesia’s line is equal to, and then more recently close to, zero. 
 
Figure 5 shows India and Indonesia’s solar and wind generation capacities over time. For 
context, the generation capacity of other renewables is also shown.4 A rapid expansion in 
India’s solar and wind generation capacities is observable, with wind capacity reaching 33 
GW in 2017 and solar 18 GW. New solar and new wind installations each exceeded new coal 
installations for the first time in 2017 (Prabhu, 2018). In contrast, solar plus wind generation 
capacity remained below 0.1 GW in Indonesia. Indonesia’s largest solar installation is the 5 
MW solar installation in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara (IRENA, 2017b). Inaugurated in 2015, 
this project has been plagued by grid and maintenance issues (Kennedy, 2018). In March 
2018, Indonesia opened its first utility-scale wind farm, the 75 MW Sidrap Wind Farm (Phase 
1) in South Sulawesi. 
                                                 
4 Note that capacity factors are not considered. IRENA (2017b, 2017c) assumes capacity factors of 
16% and 25% for utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind in Indonesia in 2030. For India, these are 
19% and 26%. 
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Figure 5: Electricity generation capacity: solar, wind, and other renewables, 2000–2017 
 
Note: y-axis scaling differs for each country. “Other renewables” is mostly hydro. It also includes bioenergy (both countries) and geothermal (Indonesia only).                       
Source: IRENA (2018a). 
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2.3 Operational aspects 
Energy is a concurrent power under India’s constitution, meaning that states and the central 
government have dual jurisdiction. State utilities are responsible for the distribution and sale 
of electricity. New electricity generation is typically procured using multi-year power 
purchasing agreements (PPAs). Day-ahead and real-time electricity delivery markets exist, 
but remain underdeveloped (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [CERC], 2018). 
Indonesia’s electricity sector is dominated by the national state-owned utility PT Perusahaan 
Listrik Negara (Persero) (PLN). This is true at the retail and transmission/distribution levels, 
and also the generation level, as more than two-thirds of Indonesia’s electricity generation 
capacity is owned by PLN and its subsidiaries (PwC Indonesia, 2017a). Independent power 
producers (IPPs) also participate in electricity generation, with procurement of new supply 
typically occurring via PPAs for periods of up to 30 years. Indonesia does not have an 
independent electricity system operator. 
3. Initiatives for solar and wind uptake 
3.1 India 
India has developed a strong institutional platform for renewables, including through the 
establishment of a Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources in 1992, the world’s first 
such ministry (IRENA, 2017c). This became the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 
(MNRE) in 2006. The Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) was 
established in 1987, with the aim of extending financial assistance to renewables and energy 
conservation projects. Its loans have returned dividends to the central government (Thapar et 
al., 2016). A National Institute of Solar Energy (NISE) and National Institute of Wind Energy 
(NIWE) carry out research, development, testing, and data provision. 
In 2010, India launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM; here called 
“Solar Mission”) with the aim of deploying 20 GW of solar by 2022. Under the Solar 
Mission, India established the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) in 2011. SECI was 
tasked with a range of initiatives for promoting solar, including procurement. 
In the early phase of the Solar Mission, an innovative approach was used to encourage solar 
power and improve its affordability for off-takers: solar power received a relatively high 
feed-in tariff, but was bundled with unallocated “reserve” power from India’s Ministry of 
Power. This made solar available to utilities at a competitive price (World Bank, 2013; 
Thapar et al., 2016; Moallemi et al., 2017). Following strong interest from project developers, 
India then moved to a reverse auction system of solar procurement. Reverse auctions involve 
project developers lodging bids for long-term PPA contracts, with the lowest bids being 
selected. States also commenced running their own reverse auctions. 
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India’s reverse auctions for solar have seen strong competition and remarkable reductions in 
prices (Figure 6). In 2017, the minimum reverse auction price for utility-scale solar 
photovoltaics (PV) fell to as low as 2.44 rupees (US$ 0.037) per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for a 
project in Rajasthan. India has established one of the world’s most competitive solar markets 
and has some of the world’s largest solar plants currently in operation and under construction 
(Buckley and Shah, 2018).  
Rapid reductions in reverse auction prices for solar partly reflect technological improvements 
and economies of scale in global solar cell production, predominantly in China. They also 
reflect a de-risking of the investment environment in India, which has helped to reduce 
financing costs.5 The low prices are notable given that PPA tariff rates are in nominal local-
currency terms, with no adjustments for inflation or exchange rate movements (Bloomberg 
NEF, 2017). Low prices (2–5 rupees per kWh) have also been achieved in reverse auctions 
for rooftop solar PV on government buildings, although these have been assisted by direct 
subsidies (Bloomberg NEF, 2017). 
Figure 6: India’s reverse auction price history:                                                               
Minimum price for utility-scale solar PV installations, by year
 
Source: Bloomberg NEF (2017). The minimum price in 2017 was 2.44 Indian rupees per kWh. This is 
equivalent to US$ 0.037 per kWh, using the exchange rate from the World Bank (2018b). 
 
A key means of reducing risk exposure for individual solar projects in India was the 
government-led establishment of solar parks. Reverse auctions have been held in which 
winning bidders have been able to lease land in a park, and sell electricity according to long-
term PPA contracts under what has been called the “plug and play” model (Chawla et al., 
                                                 
5 By no means have India’s auctions been totally de-risked. Observed risks include utilities delaying 
payments (Shrimali and Reicher, 2017; Chawla et al., 2018), utilities attempting to renegotiate prices 
during the project development and operation phases (Kenning, 2017a), and land access and 
transmission delays facing solar parks (Asian Power, 2018). 
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2018; Dobrotkova et al., 2018). Environmental impact assessments and other project pre-
requisites have also been handled by the government, which has reduced cost duplication. 
The overall model has helped to reduce, although not eliminate, uncertainties over land 
access and transmission connections. Private solar parks have also been developed. As of 
mid-2018, India had more than 30 solar parks in operation or under development (Sinha, 
2018). 
Procurement of wind power in India has a much longer history, with the first wind farm 
opening in the 1980s. State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) historically set 
fixed feed-in tariffs for wind projects, with wind investors benefitting from accelerated 
depreciation allowances (Chaudhary et al., 2015; Thapar et al., 2016). Following the success 
of the reverse auctions for solar, in 2017 the Ministry of Power released guidelines for 
competitive bidding for wind. SECI and the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu then held 
several wind auctions, with prices falling to as low as 2.43 rupees per kWh (Chandrasekaran, 
2018). Reverse auctions have consequently now become the principal mechanism for 
procuring new wind projects in India. 
The trend towards reverse auctions for renewables projects has also been global, with 
auctions in countries such as Chile and the United Arab Emirates delivering low long-term 
procurement prices (IRENA, 2017d; Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2018; REN21, 
2018). The lowest prices for utility-scale solar PV have been in locations with low land costs, 
good solar insolation, and de-risked investment environments (IRENA, 2017a; Dobrotkova et 
al., 2018).6 The use of reverse auctions differs from the early phase of solar adoption in 
developed countries such as Germany and Australia, where the focus was on incentivising 
small-scale solar through premium feed-in tariffs. A feature of India’s use of reverse auctions 
has been ongoing experimentation and learning over time.7 
Another feature of India’s renewables policy has been the use of renewable purchase 
obligations (RPOs). The 2003 Electricity Act mandated that State Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions (SERCs) specify the share of renewables in the electricity bundles of obligated 
entities, including distribution companies, open-access consumers, and captive power 
producers. India’s 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) prescribed that a 
minimum of 5% of electricity should come from non-hydro renewable sources in financial 
year 2009–2010 (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2015). This was to increase by a 
percentage point a year, to reach 15% in 2020. In 2010, the MNRE initiated a renewable 
                                                 
6 Globally, some solar/wind PPA auction prices have fallen to US$ 0.03 per kWh and below (IRENA, 
2017d). 
7 Small test auctions were run by SECI prior to moving to larger-scale auctions. The rules and designs 
of auctions have evolved to address loopholes and achieve evolving objectives (Altenburg and 
Engelmeier, 2013). 
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energy certificate (REC) mechanism to allow inter-state purchases of renewable electricity 
under RPO compliance requirements (Das and Roy, 2018). 
The performances of India’s RPO and REC mechanisms have been underwhelming. Most 
SERCs have set targets below the levels prescribed under the NAPCC, and a lack of penalties 
has led to widespread non-compliance (Shrimali and Rohra, 2012; Chaudhary et al., 2015; 
Hairat and Ghosh, 2017; Rathore et al., 2018; Sarangi, 2018; Tongia and Gross, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the RPO and REC mechanisms did help to place renewables on the agendas of 
states and territories. 
India is targeting 40 GW of grid-connected solar rooftop by 2022 (Central Electricity 
Authority, 2018). Despite rapid growth in rooftop installations, the country is not on track to 
meet this target (Bloomberg NEF, 2017; Trivedi et al., 2018; Rathore et al., 2019). 
Challenges include delays in disbursements of rooftop solar subsidies (Prateek, 2018). 
A number of other mechanisms have been used to support solar and wind investments in 
India. Individual states have run their own feed-in tariff schemes and other initiatives (World 
Bank, 2013; Chaudhary et al., 2015; Kar et al., 2016; Dawn et al., 2016; Das et al., 2017). 
The central government has provided a generation-based incentive for wind projects – in 
effect a direct subsidy (Chaudhary et al., 2015; Shrimali et al., 2017). Solar projects have 
been able to access viability gap funding and a payment security mechanism to reduce off-
take risk (World Bank, 2013). 
3.2 Indonesia 
The solar and wind sector in Indonesia has been the subject of much less concerted policy 
focus. Indonesia is yet to adopt an RPO scheme or have a successful round of large-scale 
auctions. Renewables are also supported by a much weaker institutional architecture. There is 
a Directorate General of New, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation under the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), but it has to date not been strongly 
positioned to drive rapid uptake of renewables (Bridle et al., 2018). Until recently, Indonesia 
offered premium feed-in tariffs for renewables, but resistance from the cash-strapped PLN to 
projects involving premium prices led to little uptake. Indonesia’s renewables efforts have 
principally focused on geothermal energy, but progress has been slower than planned due to 
challenges in land access, government approval processes, and negotiations with PLN, among 
other reasons (Burke and Resosudarmo, 2012; IEA, 2015). 
In 2013, considerable industry excitement was generated when the MEMR announced 
reverse auctions for 140 MW of solar PV across 80 locations. However in 2014 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the practice of allowing foreign-partnered investors to tender 
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for projects using solely imported components was unconstitutional. The MEMR closed the 
tender (Cahyafitri, 2015; Devine et al., 2015). 
Even before the Court’s decision, several issues impeded the effectiveness of the 2013 solar 
auctions. First, they were limited to projects of 5 MW or below, too small to achieve the scale 
economies required for competitive costs. Second, international developers could only 
participate via a joint venture with an Indonesian partner (Law 25/2007 concerning Capital 
Investment). This remains the case throughout Indonesia’s electricity sector. Given thin 
domestic solar expertise, competition was limited (Dobrotkova et al., 2018). There was a lack 
of information on development sites, limited grid capacity in tendered regions (contributing 
to off-take risk), and a window of only two weeks for developers to prepare their bid 
documentation. Some of the auctioned locations attracted only a few bids (Kruse, 2014). 
In 2017 PLN invited developers to pre-qualify for a 168 MW solar PV auction in Sumatra 
(under MEMR Regulation 12/2017). The pre-qualification process attracted substantial 
interest. However, the announcement of the outcome was substantially delayed, with 
participants left wondering what had happened. This type of practice undermines investor 
confidence in the sector in Indonesia. 
The MEMR and PLN frequently run tenders for the provision of off-grid electricity in eastern 
Indonesia and other locations. Village-level hybrid solar-diesel installations are among 
projects that have recently received funding. Given Indonesia’s geography and lack of 
national interconnectivity, some regions are highly suited to localised use of distributed 
electricity generation options such as small-scale solar PV. 
4. Key barriers 
This section reviews barriers to the large-scale adoption of solar and wind in India and 
Indonesia. 
4.1 Market position of coal and other fossil fuels 
A key barrier to uptake of solar and wind in India and Indonesia is the entrenched market 
positions of coal and other fossil fuels. There are powerful political-economy forces seeking 
to maintain and grow the markets for fossil fuels, including state-owned enterprises. PLN and 
its subsidiaries, for example, own the majority of Indonesia’s fossil fuel-based electricity 
generation capacity (Bridle et al., 2018). In India, up to half a million people work in the coal 
industry, and the railways and banks have business models that are closely intertwined with 
coal (The Economist, 2018; Tongia and Gross, 2018). The fossil fuel industry is an important 
source of government revenue and political support in both countries (Vishwanathan et al., 
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2018). As Byrne and Rich (1983) noted, one reason energy transitions tend to be protracted 
affairs is that incumbent players do not yield quickly to new entrants. 
In the context of fossil fuel lock-in (Erickson et al., 2015), the existence of long-term PPAs 
for coal-fired power stations creates a challenge for the quick rise of renewables. A fairly 
large number of PPAs for coal-fired power stations have already been signed in both 
countries. These typically compensate generators via both fixed (i.e. capacity) and variable 
(linked to electricity generation quantities) payments over a period of around 25–30 years 
(Chung, 2017). The fixed payments should be considered sunk, and hence not influence 
dispatch decisions. Coal-fired generators have a strong interest, however, in ensuring off-take 
of their electricity to receive the variable payments. They may also believe that off-take will 
consolidate their ability to continue to collect the fixed payments. 
4.2 Resistance from utilities 
Electricity utilities in India and Indonesia can be hesitant to support solar and wind, for 
several reasons: 
• Solar and wind generation competes directly with existing generation assets. 
• Generation for self-use is a direct source of competition for on-grid electricity sales, 
eating into revenue collections. 
• Intermittent power supplies introduce grid management challenges. 
• Renewables projects are often located away from existing transmission lines, requiring 
considerable investment in transmission infrastructure. Utilities often do not have 
appropriate incentives to invest in this infrastructure. Indeed, utility-scale solar and 
wind projects have received exemptions from paying inter-state transmission charges in 
India (Deloitte, 2018). 
• Electricity utilities often have large debts and operate at a financial loss (Ghosh and 
Ganesan, 2015; Atal et al., 2018; Tongia and Gross, 2018), constraining their ability to 
pursue renewables investments that in some (but not all) instances involve cost 
premiums, especially once transmission and grid management costs are considered. 
This issue also contributes to off-take risks. 
In both countries, resistance from utilities has contributed to difficulties in obtaining net 
meters for rooftop solar, including delays of up to several months (Trivedi et al., 2018; 
Rathore et al., 2019). Utility-scale solar and wind projects have also been delayed or had their 
power curtailed due to transmission issues (World Bank, 2013; Viswamohanan and 
Aggarwal, 2018). 
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4.3 Prices: an uneven playing field 
4.3.1 Electricity and fossil fuel subsidies 
A key obstacle in India and Indonesia is that in some settings solar and wind must compete 
against (a) subsidised fossil fuels, and (b) subsidised on-grid electricity.8 Figure 7 shows 
estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies, including for fuels used in the generation of 
electricity. These subsidies – totalling US$13 billion in India and US$16 billion in Indonesia 
in 2016 – are the result of consumers being able to purchase energy products such as 
electricity, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas at below-cost prices. Access to below-cost on-
grid electricity reduces the attractiveness of direct investments in rooftop solar. In Indonesia, 
access to below-cost gasoline and diesel reduces the attractiveness of electric vehicles (a 
complementary technology to solar and wind electricity generation). 
Figure 7: Fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 2016 
  
Note: These are subsidies in the form of below-cost provision of fossil fuels consumed directly by end-users or 
as inputs to electricity generation. None were recorded for coal. Producer subsidies, for example capital 
injections into state-owned enterprises, are not included. Source: IEA (2017c). 
 
Indonesia’s domestic market obligation for coal is an example of an intervention that 
facilitates below-cost access to fossil fuels. The obligation requires 25% of domestic coal 
production to be reserved for domestic electricity generators, at a price capped at US$70 per 
tonne or below (depending on the coal type). This artificial suppression of the domestic coal 
price undermines the competitiveness of solar and wind. Separately, the fossil fuel industries 
of both countries are beneficiaries of production assistance in the form of tax breaks and 
subsidies. Attwood et al. (2017) estimated this assistance at US$0.6 billion in Indonesia in 
2015, mostly as a result of preferential royalty and tax rates for coal mines. Tax incentives, 
                                                 
8 In other settings, taxes apply. For instance, in India gasoline and diesel are subject to excise duty and 
value-added tax. 
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including accelerated depreciation allowances, also exist for renewables projects (Telang, 
2015; Thapar et al., 2016; PwC Indonesia, 2017a; Sarangi, 2018). 
There has been some success in reducing fossil fuel and electricity subsidies in both India and 
Indonesia. For instance, Indonesia’s government reduced electricity subsidies during 2013–
2017 in a reform that appeared to contribute to improvements in the efficiency of electricity 
use (Burke and Kurniawati, 2018). However in 2018 it was announced that key electricity 
and fuel prices in Indonesia would be frozen until after the 2019 presidential election 
(Singgih, 2018). 
4.3.2 Overseas support for coal-fired power stations 
Another price-based distortion in Indonesia has been the availability of subsidised finance for 
new coal-fired generators from the export credit agencies and bilateral development banks of 
China, Japan, and South Korea. This support has typically been tied to the technologies and 
expertise of the donors (Market Forces, 2017). 
4.3.3 Under-priced externalities 
Fossil fuels are a source of negative externalities in the form of greenhouse gases and local 
pollutants, causing major health and other economic costs (Khilnani and Tiwari, 2018). 
Indian cities are among the world’s most polluted, with Balakrishnan et al. (2019) estimating 
that outdoor particulate matter pollution from fossil fuels and other sources led to around 
670,000 deaths in India in 2017. Attwood et al. (2017) estimated that the externality costs of 
local and global pollutants from coal-fired electricity generation in Indonesia are around US 
$0.06 per kWh.9 
Ideally, external costs would be incorporated into prices to ensure that the economic system 
properly considers all costs (Burke, 2014; Parry et al., 2017). Externality pricing is, however, 
very limited in both India and Indonesia.10 Instead, subsidies for fossil fuel use in effect serve 
as a negative price. Best and Burke (2018) found that countries that do not have a price on 
carbon are less successful in the adoption of solar and wind power. 
An exception in terms of externality pricing has been India’s clean energy cess: a levy on 
production and imports of coal, lignite, and peat that was introduced in 2010. The cess aimed 
to penalise coal and promote the use of clean energy. Revenue went into a National Clean 
Energy Fund (NCEF) to finance clean energy initiatives, although in practice most of the 
funds have not been used in this way (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2016). The 
cess was initially 50 rupees (US $0.76) per tonne of coal. It was increased to 400 rupees 
                                                 
9 Residential use of primary biomass also leads to sizeable negative externalities. 
10 Indonesia considered (Ministry of Finance, 2009), but is yet to adopt, a carbon tax. 
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(around US $6) by 2016. The cess was then merged into India’s new goods and services tax 
(GST) in 2017. Remaining funds in the NCEF were diverted to a GST compensation fund. 
4.3.4 A price cap on renewables in Indonesia 
In 2017, Indonesia capped feed-in tariffs for new solar and wind projects (among others) at 
85% of the regional average cost of electricity generation (biaya pokok penyediaan 
pembangkitan), termed “BPP” (MEMR Regulation 50/2017). This applies in regions where 
the regional BPP is higher than the national BPP. In regions where regional BPP is less than 
or equal to the national average, developers are able to negotiate with PLN. The regulation 
was motivated by the observation of low solar and wind prices in procurement processes 
overseas (Kennedy, 2018). Official BPP calculations are an underestimate of the true costs of 
electricity generation, as they exclude capital subsidies and below-cost access to fossil fuels 
such as coal. The effect of MEMR Regulation 50/2017 is thus that, in many settings, new 
renewables projects must outcompete established incumbents. 
4.3.5 Lack of dynamic pricing 
Another issue affecting the competitiveness of solar and wind in both India and Indonesia is a 
lack of dynamic pricing. Real-time electricity markets are thin, making it challenging to 
manage grids with increasing shares of intermittent renewables as there are often inadequate 
real-time signals to incentivise rampable generation. Retail prices are also typically set in a 
rigid way that does not reflect temporal variation in the scarcity of electricity. This leads to, 
for example, consumers facing a dampened incentive to install rooftop solar, which is able to 
generate electricity at times that coincide with relatively high electricity demand (e.g. hot 
afternoons). 
4.4 Disadvantageous regulatory settings 
New electricity-sector investors – including solar and wind investors – face numerous 
regulatory hurdles in Indonesia. One recently-introduced barrier is the requirement for all 
new utility-scale, grid-connected projects to operate on a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
basis. The “transfer” obligation means that projects must be handed over to PLN at the expiry 
of their PPA (MEMR Regulation 50/2017), and was introduced following a 2016 
Constitutional Court decision that clarified requirements for public control in the electricity 
sector.11 It is understood that even project land must be transferred, although this could 
perhaps be on a leased basis. While BOOT requirements also apply to fossil fuel-based 
plants, they form a greater disincentive – and add to uncertainty and contracting costs – for 
relatively space-intensive projects such as solar and wind, especially when they are closely 
                                                 
11 Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 111/PUU-XIII/2015 [Constitutional Court Decision no. 
111/PUU-XII/2015; final decision 14 December 2016] (Indonesia). 
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embedded with existing assets such as industrial parks or plantations (PwC Indonesia, 2018). 
A broad-based BOOT requirement thus risks impeding the dynamism of the sector.12 
Other regulatory barriers also exist. PLN is typically required to receive a share, in some 
cases a majority share, of equity in electricity-sector investments (Bridle et al., 2018). There 
are restrictions on transfers of ownership during the project development phase (MEMR 
Regulation 49/2017; PwC Indonesia, 2017a). The obligation for PLN to operate renewable 
plants up to 10 MW in size (the “must run” obligation; MEMR Regulation 50/2017, art 4(3)) 
does not apply to larger plants. A requirement for PLN to “take or pay” under PPAs 
(Regulation 10/2017, art 16) explicitly excludes intermittent renewables. 
Electricity generators in Indonesia that wish to sell their electricity to the grid require an 
electricity business supply license (IUPTL; Electricity Law 2009, articles 10 and 19). This is 
only available for operations that have a PPA with PLN (Government Regulation 14/2012 
article 13(4)). As a result, it is infeasible for small and medium installations (the size range of 
many possible renewables projects) to generate revenue from selling to the grid. 
A new solar rooftop regulation – MEMR Regulation 49/2018 – has established a clearer 
framework for on-grid PLN customers to use solar PV to offset their electricity bill (as 
“prosumers”). Under the regulation, the size of PV systems can be up to 100% of the total 
inverter capacity of the prosumer’s connection to PLN (article 5). However, the per-kWh 
value of exported electricity is limited to 65% of PLN’s applicable tariff (article 6), so net 
metering is not on a 1:1 basis. Some prosumers continue to have to pay “parallel operation” 
charges, including a connection charge and a normal energy use charge.13 Industrial 
prosumers are subject to capacity and emergency energy charges for their solar energy 
systems, which reduce the attractiveness of installing. 
Other issues in Indonesia include the frequency of regulatory changes and the opaqueness of 
procurement processes (Bridle et al., 2018; PwC Indonesia, 2017b, 2018). There have been 
several major changes to solar PV procurement regulations since 2013, and developers often 
need to restructure their projects to comply with new rules. Negotiations with PLN often 
proceed on a project-by-project basis, involving uncertainties and delays. Multiple 
overlapping regulations exist, often with ambiguous definitions and seemingly conflicting 
provisions (IEA, 2015).14 PPA contract conditions are not made fully transparent. In India, 
                                                 
12 BOOT requirements can be more appropriate in some project-specific settings, for example projects 
in a solar park. India’s solar parks typically use the BOOT approach. 
13 Normal energy use occurs while the parallel plant is operating under normal conditions as set out in 
the operational plan, and thus is a generation charge. The rate is based on prevailing tariff regulations 
(MEMR Regulation 1/2017, Article 6). 
14 In a positive reform, the MEMR has recently revoked a series of regulations in an effort to 
minimise regulatory overlap (MEMR Regulations 7 and 9 of 2018). 
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implementation of policy and procedures for net metering of small-scale solar PV has been 
slow (Das et al., 2017; Trivedi et al., 2018). 
India and Indonesia perform relatively well in the “Getting Electricity” category of the World 
Bank’s (2018c) Ease of Doing Business rankings, with India ranking 29th out of 190 countries 
in 2018 and Indonesia 38th. This is based on the time for a standard warehouse to obtain an 
electricity connection, connection costs, paperwork requirements, electricity quality, and the 
transparency of electricity tariffs. Both perform poorly on other indicators, including 
enforcement of contracts (164th and 145th), registering property (154th and 106th), and dealing 
with construction permits (181st and 108th). Governance issues can create major challenges 
for solar and wind developers. India easily outperforms Indonesia in the World Bank’s 
(2018d) Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy, ranking 37th among 111 countries. 
Indonesia places 67th, performing poorly in terms of counterparty risk, network connections 
and pricing, financial and regulatory incentives, and carbon pricing. 
4.5 Grid management challenges 
Managing intermittent energy supplies introduces technical challenges that often exceed 
current grid management capacities. Solar and wind generation has often been curtailed as a 
result. Caps on the share of intermittent renewables on the local grid, and on rooftop solar PV 
connection sizes, are also enforced. Neither country has developed comprehensive real-time 
markets, including in ancillary services such as frequency control. In Indonesia, construction 
of the country’s first pumped-hydro facility – the 1,040 MW Upper Cisokan project – has 
been delayed by land and other issues (Haryanto, 2018; World Bank, 2018e). Major 
improvements in grid management are required for a large-scale transition to intermittent 
power resources. 
4.6 Protectionism 
The solar markets of both countries are dominated by imports, predominantly from China.15 
Domestic solar module production capacities are relatively limited (Dwivedi and Rosencranz, 
2018) and domestic panels tend to be more expensive and of lower quality than some of the 
panels available on the international market (Clover, 2017). Protectionism is pushing up 
project costs, adversely affecting installation companies, utilities, and consumers.16 This 
section provides a review of protectionist interventions, with a focus on solar.  
                                                 
15 Imported panels account for more than 90% of solar installations in India (Press Trust of India, 
2018). 
16 For a discussion of the costs of solar protectionism, see Shum (2017). 
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4.6.1 India 
100% foreign equity in solar and wind installations is possible in India (Moallemi et al., 
2017). However, under Phase I of the Solar Mission, the MNRE required projects to use 
minimum quantities of domestic components. In Phase II, tenders were split into “open” and 
“domestic content requirement” (DCR) categories (Kumar, 2014). To qualify under the DCR 
category, solar cells and modules need to originate in India. 
In 2014, the US requested the establishment of a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
resolution panel to hear its complaints concerning India’s domestic content requirements. The 
panel considered whether the requirements breached the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (1994) (TRIMs). It found that they fell within article 1(a) of the TRIMS 
Illustrative List, which lays out trade-related investment measures that are inconsistent with a 
country’s obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT). An 
important question was whether the DCR measure was “mandatory” and “enforceable”. 
Several considerations influenced affirmative findings. First, failure to comply with domestic 
content requirements within 180 days of signing a PPA attracted the forfeiture of any 
monetary deposit. Second, PPAs issued under the first two phases of the Solar Mission 
contained “conditions subsequent”, which included the fulfilment of domestic content 
requirements. Non-fulfillment could trigger sanctions and penalties. 
The panel also found that India had breached GATT article III – the “national treatment” 
obligation – which prohibits discrimination between imported products and “like” domestic 
products. Further, it found the measure was not government procurement, and therefore did 
not fall within a GATT exemption from the national treatment obligation. It also found that 
the measure was not covered by other GATT exemptions or justifications. India appealed to 
the Appellate Body, which upheld the panel’s findings (WTO, 2016). 
The US argued that India had not complied with the WTO ruling, and in 2017 requested 
authorisation from the Dispute Settlement Body to suspend concessions and other WTO 
obligations it would otherwise owe India (WTO, 2017). The matter was referred to 
arbitration. India’s experience demonstrates that countries risk protracted and expensive legal 
battles, and possible retaliation, if they pursue renewables-sector policies inconsistent with 
obligations under the WTO. 
Adding to cost pressures, in January 2018 India completed a WTO safeguards investigation 
that found that solar modules from countries including China and Malaysia caused, or 
threatened to cause, serious injury to domestic manufacturers. The investigation 
recommended a 70% ad valorem duty for 200 days. In the end, a lower duty of 25%, falling 
to 15% over two years, was imposed on solar imports from China, Malaysia, and developed 
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countries (WTO, 2018). The duty dampened investor interest (Stacey, 2018) and undermined 
the viability of recently-auctioned projects (Gokhale and Thakurta, 2018). For projects under 
MNRE schemes, a recent decision also requires criminal proceedings against officials and 
state-run enterprises that misstate the domestic content of their components (MNRE, 2018). 
4.6.2 Indonesia 
Indonesia levies a 5% tariff on imported solar panels. The Electricity Law of 2009 also 
requires electricity generators that supply the public (IUPTL holders) to prioritise local 
content. This includes those exporting electricity from rooftop PV generators to PLN’s grid. 
Current requirements are for 40.68% of goods and service inputs to grid-connected solar PV 
projects to be local content (Ministry of Industry Regulation 5/2017 amending Ministry of 
Industry Regulation 54/2012 article 13A). The requirement is slightly higher for off-grid 
installations (articles 12 and 13). For government-procured projects, a 40% local content 
requirement and a “company benefit value” standard apply (Presidential Regulation 
16/2018), with the latter based on companies’ investment in and contribution to the nation. 
Tenders have also offered premium prices for projects using local content (Dobrotkova et al., 
2018). Indonesia’s local content requirements have yet to be tested for WTO consistency. 
Indonesia has a variety of other protectionist restrictions.17 Foreign investors are limited to 
owning 49% of high-voltage electricity projects between 1–10 MW, and are excluded from 
small scale (< 1 MW) projects (Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia no. 
44/2016, appendix III.D no. 143, 142).18 Regulations require that solar installations are 
developed by local engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) companies (Ministry of 
Industry Regulation 54/2012).  
4.7 Underwhelming political support in Indonesia 
International experience shows that top-level political support is a prerequisite for large-scale 
investment in capital-intensive energy-sector facilities (Sovacool, 2012; Cherp et al., 2017). 
India’s Prime Minister-level prioritisation of renewables has been fundamental to the 
comparative success of the sector. In Indonesia, dedicated champions of solar and wind have 
been lacking. While the country has an ambitious renewables target, in practice solar and 
wind have tended to be given low priority, and there is a broad assumption that the target will 
not be met (Bridle et al., 2018). Indeed, an examination of PLN’s list of planned capacity 
                                                 
17 Patunru (2018) provides an overview of economic nationalism and protectionist tendencies in 
Indonesia. 
18 For projects over 10 MW, 95% foreign participation is allowed, or 100% for public–private 
partnerships during the concession period (appendix III.D no. 145). 
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additions (RUPTL) reveals much more modest plans for solar and wind than are set out in the 
National Energy Plan (RUEN).19 
4.8 Land access 
Land access challenges are a key impediment to solar and wind projects and the development 
of transmission and distribution infrastructure in both India and Indonesia, with 
complications arising from overlapping permits, fragmented ownership, and unregistered 
land (World Bank, 2013; Dutu, 2016; IRENA, 2017b). Long lead times for land procurement 
often reflect a lack of agreement between community members, land owners, and the 
government over issues such as rightful ownership and the land’s fair price. Some delays 
represent genuine concerns, while others reflect bureaucratic delays or opportunistic, rent-
seeking behaviour (Fitzpatrick, 2008). In some instances, land issues have led to the 
cancellation of projects. An example is a proposed 50 MW wind farm in Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia (Wicaksono, 2017). 
5. Strategies to facilitate solar and wind use 
We now discuss potential strategies for boosting solar and wind uptake in India and 
Indonesia. We focus primarily on Indonesia, drawing lessons from India’s relative success. 
5.1 High-level political commitment and ambitious targets 
India’s mission-based approach for solar – which accords with the argument for mission-
based sectoral development advanced by Mazzucato (2015) – has underpinned its solar 
boom. Given the highly political nature of energy and the substantial government 
involvement in the coal and electricity sectors, there is a case for a similar government-
facilitated approach in Indonesia. This would require strong leadership from the President 
and the Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources, and support from other key actors. On 
issues such as electrification, slowing deforestation, and integrated pest management, 
Indonesia has shown that quite rapid progress can occur when there is sufficient institutional 
and political backing (Burke and Resosudarmo, 2012; Resosudarmo, 2012). 
5.2 An attractive investment environment 
Ideally, the electricity grid would become more like an open-access carrier, with regulatory 
requirements and disincentives to supply-side investment in solar and wind generation 
capacity being minimised. Enhancing the overall attractiveness of the investment 
environment for solar and wind is a multi-faceted challenge, and involves reducing regulatory 
uncertainty and removing or relaxing the most unattractive barriers to investment, including 
                                                 
19 The RUPTL (2018–2027) includes only around 1 GW and 589 MW of new solar and wind capacity 
over the period 2018–2025 (p. III-10). 
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some of those discussed in section 4. A simple reform in the case of Indonesia would be to 
introduce more transparency over the terms of PPA contracts. 
5.3 From fossil fuel subsidies to emissions pricing 
Reductions in consumer and producer subsidies for fossil fuels and consumption subsidies for 
on-grid electricity, together with the adoption of explicit prices on carbon and other negative 
externalities, would help zero-emissions technologies compete on a more level playing field 
in both countries. One option is the use of coal levies, together with complementary measures 
to support low-income consumers and affected workforces. Parry et al. (2017) concluded that 
increasing India’s coal cess could make a major contribution to reducing deaths from 
pollution, and generate net benefits for the economy. 
While such reforms can be politically challenging, experience shows that well-communicated 
reforms, linked to tangible benefits, can secure popular acceptance (Rentschler and Bazilian, 
2017). One strategy is to ensure that reforms are visibly coupled with reductions in existing 
taxes, or priority expenditure initiatives. Both India and Indonesia have mechanisms that can 
be used to target benefits to low-income households (Burke, 2014; Parry et al., 2017). There 
is growing potential for the use of environmental taxes in Indonesia following the 
introduction of Government Regulation 46/2017 on environmental economic instruments and 
Presidential Regulation 77/2018 requiring the establishment of a public service agency for 
environmental fund management. 
5.4 Openness to international trade and investment 
Countries benefit from the ability to employ the lowest-cost and highest-quality technologies 
available on the world market, and the lowest-cost sources of finance. To achieve this, it is 
vital that protectionist barriers are minimised. There are alternative ways to encourage local 
employment in solar and wind industries, including by having a healthy installation sector 
and targeted investments in research and development (OECD, 2015). The importance of 
openness to trade also extends to cross-border trade in electricity. Ideally, solar, wind, and 
energy storage facilities would be located at the best possible sites, which may be across 
international borders.20 Trade and investment liberalisation may be undertaken via unilateral 
policy changes or international agreements.21 
  
                                                 
20 There is a proposal to develop an Asian Renewable Energy Hub (AREH) that would supply solar- 
and wind-powered electricity and hydrogen from Australia to Indonesia and beyond. See 
https://asianrehub.com/. 
21 See Aisbett et al. (2018) for a recent discussion of public international economic law supporting 
international electricity trade and investment in the region. 
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5.5 Large-scale reverse auctions and solar parks in Indonesia?  
In Indonesia, a major new round of reverse auctions would have the potential to provide a 
sizeable impetus to the adoption of solar and wind. While legal issues surrounding foreign 
participation form constraints that will tend to place upward pressure on prices, the country 
could seek to establish a facilitating environment that is as encouraging as possible to 
investors, within legal constraints. 
One way to seek to facilitate low auction prices would be to pursue India’s solar park 
concept. Government facilitation of land procurement is justifiable given that land titling and 
other issues create real challenges for the private sector, pushing up project costs. The solar 
park model could also help to alleviate challenges associated with a shortage of data on grid 
capacity, solar resources, and flooding frequency at installation sites, as data could be 
provided. Such data are important for securing low-cost finance. Government procurement of 
land could also help to counteract the disincentive effects of Indonesia’s BOOT requirement. 
Instead of having to obtain, and subsequently hand over, land for solar installations, project 
developers could focus on their comparative advantage relative to the government – namely 
sourcing and installing the systems. 
A challenge is site selection for solar parks. Java, where electricity demand is highest, is 
densely populated and has high land prices. Interconnections with other islands would 
potentially allow solar parks to be sited elsewhere and still access the Java market, although 
would be expensive and take years to build.22 Degraded agricultural land (Fargione et al., 
2008) or former mining land may provide suitable solar park siting locations.23 To ensure 
compatibility with sustainable development goals, it is important that existing land users are 
fairly compensated – regardless of whether they possess formal land title. Otherwise, the 
renewables industry could risk political opposition over “land grabs”.24 
5.6 An Indonesian Clean Energy Agency? 
Indonesia has the potential to adopt aspects of the institutional architecture for renewables 
utilised by India, perhaps through the establishment of an Indonesian Clean Energy Agency. 
Responsibilities of this agency (or multiple new agencies) could include: 
• Managing renewables procurement, including reverse auctions. 
• Establishing and administering solar parks. 
                                                 
22 A Java-Sumatra undersea transmission cable has been proposed, but has faced delays (Prakoso, 
2017). 
23 There is also substantial rooftop space. Another potential is floating solar (Kenning, 2017b). 
24 This issue has received much attention in the case of large-scale land acquisitions for agriculture. 
This is particularly so in Africa, where governments have been accused of supporting foreign 
investors at the expense of marginalised local populations. See, for example, Zoomers (2010). 
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• Administering an RPO. 
• Planning. 
• Capacity building. 
• Securing and utilising international concessional finance. 
• Investing in research and development. 
• Data provision. 
Several sources of international finance could possibly be harnessed by such an agency, 
including the Green Climate Fund.25 It is important to note, however, that a new agency may 
be ineffective in achieving key responsibilities in the absence of broader improvements in 
sectoral governance (Jarvis, 2012). Any new agency would need strong backing from the 
President and a design suited to overcoming procedural bottlenecks. The strengthening of 
institutions for renewables development is often recommended as a pre-requisite for strong 
renewables uptake (e.g. Dulal et al., 2013). 
5.7 Renewable purchase obligations in Indonesia? 
A potential reform to increase the likelihood of Indonesia meeting its renewables target 
would be the introduction of an RPO scheme. Under an RPO, renewables projects would 
generate “green certificates”. PLN could be required to acquire a certain number of these 
certificates each year so as to meet the national renewables target. While the implementation 
of India’s RPO scheme has been imperfect, implementation should be somewhat easier in 
Indonesia given the more centralised governance that exists for the sector. One strategy 
would be for RPO compliance to be listed among the key performance indicators of PLN’s 
Board of Directors. This would ensure that incentives to meet targets exist at the individual as 
well as the institutional level. 
5.8 Incentivising utilities 
Altered financial models could be used to align the incentives of utilities with the rapid 
adoption of modern renewables. For example, governments could reward utilities for the 
successful procurement, transmission, distribution, and utilisation of solar and wind.26 In 
Indonesia, funds for such payments could possibly be redirected from existing budget lines 
                                                 
25 Some overseas concessional finance is already being accessed. For example, the Sidrap Wind Farm 
(Phase 1) was assisted by a long-term loan from the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC). A new central agency might be able to deliver better overall results in terms of accessing 
concessional finance. 
26 An example of this type of approach is India’s Sustainable Rooftop Implementation for Solar 
Transfiguration of India (SRISTI) scheme, which financially rewards utilities (and others) for 
achieving rooftop solar targets. 
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for fossil fuel and electricity subsidies.27 Another possibility is for utilities to be encouraged 
to enter the rooftop solar installation market themselves (Bloomberg NEF, 2017). By 
improving the financial positions of electricity utilities, a move to cost-reflective retail 
electricity prices would also help to reduce off-take risks for solar and wind investors 
(Shrimali and Reicher, 2017). Off-grid solutions that side-step utilities also have potential in 
some rural and remote settings (see USAID and Clean Energy Access Network, 2018). 
5.9 Grid management 
Sizeable investments in grid management will be required to achieve a large-scale transition 
to intermittent generation sources (IEA, 2015).28 Priorities include larger roles for system 
planning, forecasting, real-time markets, and energy storage, as well as improved “visibility” 
of intermittent renewables so as to facilitate real-time grid management (NITI Aayog, 2015; 
Palchak et al., 2017; Pierpont and Nelson, 2017; CERC, 2018; Buckley et al., 2019). 
Improved interconnectivity via high-voltage, direct current (HVDC) cables would greatly 
boost Indonesia’s ability to move to high reliance on solar and wind. Ideally, 
transmission/distribution infrastructure would be planned to suit distributed energy resources, 
and be ready in advance of capacity installations (Deloitte, 2018). 
There are substantial opportunities for international sharing of lessons and experiences in 
managing solar and wind on the grid. The International Solar Alliance (ISA), headquartered 
in India, could play a role in this type of knowledge exchange. 
5.10 Enhanced research capacity 
A large-scale transition to renewables will require significant investment in technical capacity 
and innovation (IRENA, 2018b). India has stronger energy-sector research capacity than 
Indonesia, especially in The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) and policy-focused think 
tanks. There is considerable scope for additional investment in research capacity in Indonesia, 
with a focus on intermittent renewables and grid management.29  
5.11 Private-led solutions 
Private enterprises are increasingly seeking to procure solar and wind electricity, both to 
reduce electricity bills and meet social responsibility objectives. Procurement can occur via 
direct investment, business-to-business (B2B) contracts, or purchases of renewable 
                                                 
27 To meet legal requirements, such support would need to be framed as being support to PLN rather 
than IPPs. 
28 Note that coal-based electricity expansion would also require substantial investments in 
infrastructure, including ports, rail lines, and transmission lines. 
29 Indonesia launched a Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Clean Energy in Bali in 2016, but this has yet 
to get off the ground. 
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certificates (Telang, 2015). Internationally, more than 100 companies – including India’s 
Infosys and Tata Motors – have pledged to go 100% renewable in their energy use 
(http://there100.org). In the context of growing demand, it is important that regulatory 
settings provide attractive platforms for the supply-side of the renewables market to function.  
Innovative financing and business models are likely to be important for rooftop solar and 
other segments of the renewables market (Kuldeep et al., 2018). The third-party model – 
where an enterprise retains ownership of rooftop solar installations and shares the benefits 
with rooftop owners via financial payments or lowered electricity prices – is worth pursuing. 
This model has been employed in India, although for only a minority of solar rooftop 
installations (Rathore et al., 2019). 
5.12 Additional issues 
Additional issues of high importance for the large-scale adoption of solar and wind energy in 
India and Indonesia include: 
• Ensuring project quality, especially for solar. It is important that contracts and 
markets reward only genuine provision of electricity generation and/or generation 
capacity. If so, investors will have an incentive to ensure project quality and 
maintenance.  
• The operation and maintenance of projects in remote areas, some of which have 
fallen into disrepair due to problems in disbursing funds and other reasons. IRENA 
(2017b) recommended that Indonesia establish an entity responsible for operations 
and maintenance that engages local communities in the task. 
• Human capital. There is scope for governments to boost training in key skills in 
project maintenance and grid management (Gabriel, 2016). Sovacool (2012) 
concluded that capacity building is vital for the success of renewables projects. 
• Policies for a phase-out of coal and other fossil fuels. There is scope for work on 
strategies to facilitate a just transition for workers and communities who might be 
adversely affected by the rise of alternative energy technologies. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
India and Indonesia have ambitious targets for the adoption of solar and wind, and India has 
made impressive progress, with a boom in new installations facilitated by large-scale reverse 
auctions. Indonesia has also taken early steps, such as the opening of its first wind farm. 
Substantial potential exists for uptake of solar and wind energy, although there are sizeable 
barriers to overcome before they can take on a major role in the electricity mix. A key 
challenge is the need to establish an investment environment suited to unlocking the vast 
opportunities in the sector. 
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This paper has identified barriers to solar and wind uptake in India and Indonesia. Some 
involve direct disincentives for investors; for example, Indonesia’s BOOT requirement that 
projects must be handed over to the utility at the end of the PPA term, even when they are 
closely embedded with existing assets. Others are structural issues, such as the weak financial 
positions of transmission and distribution utilities and their underdeveloped capacities to 
manage intermittent power sources. India’s approach of using large-scale reverse auctions 
and solar parks serves as an attractive model for Indonesia. 
We have proposed a number of other possible reforms for Indonesia, including an RPO 
scheme and the establishment of an Indonesian Clean Energy Agency. We also recommend 
avoiding the temptation to pursue infant industry protection for nascent solar and wind 
component manufacturing industries. Total employment in the renewables industry is likely 
to be best served by having a vibrant and growing installation industry that is able to access 
quality inputs at the lowest costs (OECD, 2015). Trade openness will also help to ensure 
least-cost energy for millions of households and commercial consumers alike. 
Our focus on solar and wind was motivated by the growing prominence of these technologies 
and their falling project costs. Other renewable electricity generation options, such as 
geothermal in Indonesia, also have potential. Ideally, policy settings would ensure that 
electricity generation technologies are able to compete on a level playing field, and one that 
incorporates externality costs. 
Large expansions in electricity generation capacity will be required to keep up with 
electricity demand in India and Indonesia. If a share of this investment is in coal-fired power 
stations, it would risk creating stranded assets due to escalating competition from renewables 
(Gray et al., 2018; Liebman and Foster, 2019). Indeed, a number of planned coal-fired power 
stations have already been cancelled in both India and Indonesia, and some existing coal-fired 
power stations are operating at reduced capacity factors (Woods, 2017; Buckley, 2018; 
Vishwanathan et al., 2018). Governments in both countries have the chance to play major 
roles in steering their energy systems to a lower-emission future.  
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